[DOWNLOAD] "Challenging the Liberal Settlement (Austria, Denmark)" by University of New Brunswick Law Journal ~ Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Challenging the Liberal Settlement (Austria, Denmark)
- Author : University of New Brunswick Law Journal
- Release Date : January 01, 2006
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 251 KB
Description
Within two weeks of the Danish cartoon-provoked riots, an Austrian court sentenced the "revisionist" historian David Irving, a person well known in European neo-Nazi circles, to three years imprisonment under a law that prohibits denial of the Holocaust. It is quite inevitable that those two events should be considered together. One forthright response is that the suppression of Danish cartoonists and the suppression of Holocaust-deniers are both wrong, because freedom of expression is a value that defeats all compromise, always. A second possible (but I think unusual--or not usually avowed) response is that free expression is of no significant value to begin with, so that nothing important stands in the way of suppressing any objectionable views or images at all, if they cause offense. A third response is that one or other of these events--mocking Muhammad, denying the Holocaust may rightly attract coercive response, but for context-specific reasons. That is the response that I want to discuss here: can one hold a background belief in free expression, but also believe that there should be contextually-justified exceptions to it? Such a position is very common, and, because of its evident moderation, politically tempting. But what amounts to a justifiable exception? Are there good reasons for them? Or are sentences that typically begin "I believe in free speech, but..." no more than bloodless equivocations? The starting-point for discussion of freedom of expression in western countries is what I shall term--anachronistically--"the liberal settlement." In the early modern period, European societies had their fill of religious wars, and eventually came to adopt beliefs and practices that secured peace by decoupling religious and political claims from one another. As Locke (among many others) argued, if states can legitimately impose religion, then churches will be obliged to compete for control of states if they are to survive, justifying their claims on the basis of non-negotiable principles that make reasoned political coexistence impossible. ("Every church is orthodox to itself," he wrote.) So the solution is that no one's religion should be imposed, and hence a basic condition of citizenship is that each must accept the other's freedom to practice. This is of course to compress a long and complex story and to suppress many qualifications and exceptions, as well as to short-circuit the various rival high-level justifications that liberal political philosophers have offered for arriving at the goal of toleration. But some form of the liberal settlement is the taken-for-granted basis for the belief that before political contestation takes place--before we decide, that is, who is to win and who is to lose--a scheme of protective rights takes some important liberties of individuals and groups off the table so that they are not placed at risk. And the freedom to express one's beliefs--religious or otherwise--is generally taken to be among the most basic of those liberties. A settlement originating in religious pacification comes to inform a general view about the boundary between state power and personal entitlement.